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57 
WHY DO WE NEED A LAWYER?: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
DIVORCE CASES 
 
Judith G. McMullen* 
Debra Oswald** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a quiet revolution going on in divorce courts throughout America: 
many divorce litigants are foregoing lawyers and handling their divorces by 
themselves. This trend creates certain problems for a legal system that has been 
largely structured on the assumption that cases will be resolved at a trial—or in 
pre-trial negotiations—in which lawyers are the vehicles for advancing the 
interests of the litigants. Judges, practicing lawyers and legal scholars have 
addressed how best to handle what appears to be ever-increasing numbers of pro se 
divorce litigants and various approaches are being implemented in many states. 
Special forms and information packets are offered to divorcing couples, online 
services are available, and judges devote a lot of time and energy trying to help 
floundering divorce litigants without losing the impartiality that is required from 
the bench.1 Practicing lawyers may lament the potential loss of clients, although 
lawyers also may conclude that the exodus from their offices is really the result of 
poor people opting for self-representation. This characterization of the 
phenomenon allows lawyers to rationalize the loss of business as the loss of 
unprofitable business they did not really want. 
Here is the story as many lawyers tell it: people who have little income and 
few assets may conclude that a do-it-yourself divorce is a good option. These folks 
may be disadvantaged in custody situations, but this cannot be helped. Custody 
problems can be resolved in court-based mediation without the couple having 
separate attorneys anyway. However, divorcing couples with decent incomes, 
significant amounts of property or minor children whose custody might be 
disputed will gravitate towards lawyers. While a few people of means will opt to 
proceed with their divorces pro se, it is generally agreed that this is not a good 
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1 See, e.g., Welcome to the Wisconsin Court System Self-Help Family Web Site, 
https://prosefamily.wicourts.gov/pages/welcome.html;jsessionid=FDDA7A67AF147170A
D60246D7C4DC00A (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (a Wisconsin court’s link that allows 
divorcing couples to access divorce materials from their counties of residence); see also 
Carolyn D. Schwarz, Student Note, Pro se Divorce Litigants: Frustrating the Traditional 
Role of the Trial Court Judge and Court Personnel, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 655 passim (2004). 
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idea. In other words, conventional wisdom in the legal profession says that divorce 
litigants are better off with lawyers and significantly disadvantaged without 
lawyers. Since relatively poor people are perceived as having less to lose, their 
financial inability to obtain lawyers is tolerated by the system. Is this version 
accurate? 
There has been some study of self-representation by litigants in various 
contexts, including divorce, and we have some knowledge about levels of self-
representation and the reasons behind it.2 We know, for example, that many 
divorce cases involve at least one pro se litigant.3 We also know that divorce 
litigants choose self-representation for non-financial as well as financial reasons.4 
We know that many people who work in the court system, including lawyers and 
judges, are troubled by the large influx of pro se litigants.5 There is, however, 
much about the pro se explosion in divorce cases that is not well understood. We 
do not know whether or not the increase in pro se divorce litigants is a good thing 
or a bad thing from the client’s perspective. Lawyers tend to theorize that pro se 
divorce litigants would be better off if they had legal counsel, but there has been 
little research on that point. 
Why do people choose to represent themselves in a divorce? Is it purely a 
question of economics, or do people avoid lawyers for other reasons (as has been 
suggested by some research)? What about the perception of the legal profession 
that self-represented divorce litigants are at a disadvantage? Are divorce litigants 
better off when they are represented by legal counsel? 
This article attempts to address some of these issues by drawing on empirical 
data. We set out to examine divorcing couples within a wide range of incomes, and 
who are living in a county with urban, suburban and rural communities. Thus, we 
selected Waukesha County, Wisconsin; a county adjacent to Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. We believe that by studying a specific population with such diverse 
levels of income and living arrangements we have taken a snapshot of how choices 
about lawyer representation during the divorce process are affecting average 
Americans. We examined a random sample of 567 divorce cases initiated in 2005. 
In an attempt to identify possible reasons for a decision to proceed pro se, we 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY 
OF LEGAL SERVICES, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE 
LITIGANT (A.B.A. Ass’n 1994) [hereinafter ABA 1994 REPORT]. By the early 1990s, a 
majority of parties were self-represented in some jurisdictions. Id. at 5-7. The ABA 1994 
REPORT noted that persons were more likely to self-represent if they earned less than 
$50,000 per year and if the case was “simple,” such as when there were no children 
involved. Id. at 9-10. 
3 Id. at 6-8. 
4 See, e.g., id. at 9 (“[More] than 20% of the pro se litigants studied said they could 
afford a lawyer.”). 
5 See generally Schwarz, supra note 1 (describing how the judicial system erects 
barriers to helping self-represented litigants: for example, judges can’t give too much help 
lest they lose their impartiality, and court staff are prohibited from giving legal advice). 
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examined the relationship between various factors (such as age, income level or 
gender) and pro se status. We also attempted to examine the question of whether 
pro se litigants are worse off than those represented by legal counsel. The 
difficulty of defining success in the context of divorce litigation makes it especially 
hard to assess the impact of having attorney representation as opposed to 
proceeding pro se. For reasons discussed in detail later, we looked at two factors: 
the correlation between representation status and the likelihood of maintenance 
awards, and the correlation between representation status and the length of the 
divorce case. 
Our data confirms the conventional wisdom that many individuals seeking a 
divorce elect to proceed without a lawyer: in our sample 43.9% of husbands and 
37.7% of the wives chose to represent themselves in their divorce cases.6 Our data 
also showed that both husbands and wives tended to employ attorneys when 
certain factors, such as minor children, a longer marriage, or higher husband’s 
income, made the divorce more complex.7 This suggests that divorce litigants have 
good, common sense notions about when self-representation is feasible and when it 
is not. It also suggests that pro se divorce litigants may not be as disadvantaged as 
sometimes is feared, because they may indeed be perfectly capable of handling the 
mechanics of relatively “simple” divorces, even though they may need 
professional help when more complicated legal issues are involved. 
Our attempts to measure the effect of lawyers on divorce litigants who had 
them yielded mixed results. Our data showed that divorces tended to take longer 
when the litigants were represented by lawyers. This extra time is likely partly or 
mostly due to the greater complexity of issues in cases where lawyers were 
employed, but it is also possible that lawyers increase the length of the process 
either deliberately or by virtue of their characteristic methods of practice. 
Similarly, we found that spousal support and family support were more frequently 
awarded in divorces where either the wife, or both parties, had legal counsel. We 
also found, as would be expected under the laws of Wisconsin and elsewhere, that 
maintenance awards were strongly associated with higher husband income, and 
longer marriages. Since higher income and longer marriages were also associated 
with the hiring of divorce counsel, we cannot say for sure whether lawyers make 
maintenance more likely or whether clients who are likely maintenance payers or 
receivers are more likely to seek and hire lawyers. 
Ultimately, we believe our data suggests that lawyers are most utilized to deal 
with the more complex aspects of divorce, and may be less necessary for the 
routine procedural matters that many clients handle themselves. It may also be the 
case, although our research could not measure this, that lawyers serve a primary 
role that is more psychological than mechanical, at least for some clients. This may 
have important repercussions for lawyer training, as well as for the construction of 
user-friendly family court systems.  
                                                 
6 See infra tbl.1, app. A. 
7 See infra Part III.B. 
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Before describing our methodology and data, Part II of this article discusses 
the history of lawyer involvement in divorce cases in the United States, and 
describes previous research that has been performed on pro se litigants, 
particularly in the context of divorce. Part III of the article discusses the 
methodology and findings of our review of 567 divorce cases filed in Waukesha 
County, Wisconsin in 2005. Part IV discusses some of the possible implications of 
our findings, particularly for lawyer training and practice.  
 
II.  THE HISTORY OF LAWYER INVOLVEMENT IN DIVORCE 
 
For much of American history, divorce was rare and available only to a 
wealthy few.8 In A History of American Law, Lawrence Friedman recounts that the 
American colonies initially followed the tradition of England, which was 
essentially a “divorceless society” where ordinary, unhappy couples were only able 
to obtain a legal separation or, in rare cases, a legislative bill of divorce.9 After 
Independence, Northern states were quicker to adopt divorce laws than Southern 
states, with general divorce laws replacing private divorce laws by the end of the 
19th century.10 Friedman suggests that the change was driven not only by changes 
in the nature of marriage, but also by the need of the growing American middle 
class to clearly establish who owned family property.11 This movement to easier 
divorce laws had its opponents, however, with many devout people opposing it as 
a symptom of moral decay in society.12 Thus, according to Friedman, these early 
“[d]ivorce laws were a kind of compromise. In general, the law never recognized 
full, free consensual divorce. It became simpler to get a divorce than in the past; 
but divorce was not routine or automatic.”13 
Once private bills of divorce were extinct, the state laws that evolved made 
divorce available only to “innocent” parties who could prove fault on the part of 
the other spouse.14 Arguments claiming “fault” and defenses thereto were based on 
complex doctrines, and the claims had to be proven by specific evidence. Typical 
fault-based grounds for divorce included adultery, cruelty, and desertion.15 
                                                 
8 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142-44 (3d ed., 
Touchstone 2005). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 142-44. 
11 Id. at 144-45. 
12 Id. at 144. 
13 Id. at 145. 
14 The fault-based system is an adversarial model, where the husband and wife sue 
each other in court. “[D]ivorces could not be consensual and a divorce could be defended 
and defeated because of the conduct of the plaintiff (the moving or petitioning party).” 
SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 78 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
15 See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 301-03 (3d ed., Aspen 
Publishers 2005) (listing and describing adultery, cruelty, desertion and impotence as 
possible grounds for divorce). 
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Connivance,16 collusion,17 and condonation18 were typical defenses. If both 
spouses were deemed to be at fault, the doctrine of recrimination stated that they 
could not obtain a divorce at all, since there was no innocent party deserving of a 
remedy.19 These defenses supported the old English adages: “one must do equity to 
receive equity” and “one must come into court with clean hands.”20 
The esoteric and complex nature of the necessary claims made it almost a 
necessity to hire a lawyer to provide guidance through the process. Unfortunately, 
the confining nature of the fault system created a system where a lawyer’s 
expertise was frequently employed to get around the divorce laws. Although the 
law refused to recognize divorce by mutual agreement, by the end of the 19th 
century, “the vast majority of divorce cases were empty charades. Both parties 
wanted the divorce; or were at least willing to concede it to the other party. Even in 
states with rigid statutes, collusion was a way of life in divorce court.”21 Lawyers 
helped clients seek divorces in jurisdictions with more liberal laws, or helped the 
couple collude to manufacture evidence necessary to establish grounds for divorce, 
such as cruelty, desertion or adultery.22 
A system of exclusively fault-based divorce laws remained in effect in the 
United States until the late 1960s, despite the fact that collusive divorce had been 
                                                 
16 KATZ, supra note 14, at 78 (“[C]onsenting to or being involved with the ground for 
divorce, particularly adultery . . . .”). 
17 Id. (“[A]greement by the couple to commit the act, which will support the ground 
for divorce.”). 
18 Id. (“[F]orgiveness for the wrong.”). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 380. 
22 Id. at 380-81, 577-78. 
 
Most divorces in fact were collusive. The wife filed a lawsuit, told her sad 
story of abuse, neglect, desertion, or philandering; and the husband said nothing, 
did nothing, filed no papers, made no defense. The judge then granted the 
divorce, by default. In most states, the sad story was about cruelty or desertion. 
In New York, the sad story had to be a story about adultery. Here a cottage 
industry of imitation adultery sprang up. There were women who made a living 
pretending to be “the other woman.” A man checked into a hotel, and went to 
his room. The woman appeared. The two of them got partly or totally undressed. 
Suddenly, and miraculously, a photographer appeared, and took their picture. 
The man then handed over cash to the woman; she thanked him and left. The 
damning photograph somehow found its way into court, as “evidence” of 
adultery. The judges, of course, were not fools. They knew what was going on. 
They rarely bothered to ask how a photographer just happened to barge into the 
love nest and take pictures. Usually, they said nothing and did nothing. The title 
of a magazine article from 1934 tells the story in a nutshell: “I Was the 
Unknown Blonde in 100 New York Divorces. 
 
Id. (magazine article identified in Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New 
York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1936)). 
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pervasive since the late 19th century.23 Until that time, the corrupt and largely 
sham fault-based system represented an uneasy compromise between the rising 
demand for divorce, and the concerns of pious people to preserve what they 
perceived as a moral and tradition-based society.24 
In 1969, California became the first state to adopt a no-fault divorce statute,25 
and by 2001 all fifty American states had added no-fault provisions to their divorce 
laws.26 In the majority of states, no-fault and fault divorce continue to coexist as 
options.27 Perhaps the key feature of no-fault divorce is that it makes it possible for 
one spouse to obtain a divorce, even without the consent or cooperation of the 
other spouse.28 
As no-fault divorce became more widely available, attitudes towards divorce 
changed as well. Divorce rates began to soar at about the same time divorces 
became easier to obtain; although whether one of these realities caused the other 
has been the subject of considerable debate. Some scholars argue that no-fault 
divorce laws were a key factor in the increase in the American divorce rate. For 
example, economist Leora Friedberg examined data in all fifty states, and 
compared the trends in each state both before and after the adoption of unilateral 
divorce laws. She concluded that the laws themselves resulted in a significant 
increase in divorces.29 Similarly, Margaret F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley have 
claimed that divorce rates are higher in states with no-fault laws because divorce 
under a fault-based system penalizes fault, and thus deters people from seeking 
divorce.30 
                                                 
23 Id. at 145. 
24 Id. at 381.  
25 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 67 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1987). 
26 KATZ, supra note 14, at 80. 
27 Id. at 79. 
28 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 579.  
 
[N]o-fault went way beyond the old dream of reformers—the dream of 
legalizing consensual divorce. No-fault was unilateral divorce. It meant that 
either party, whatever the other one felt, could get out of the marriage. People 
talked about marriage as a partnership. Partnership implies cooperation, 
mutuality, and sharing, which is what good marriages are. But under a no-fault 
system, there is no partnership at the end of a marriage. Each partner, in an 
intensely personal way, chooses to stay in the marriage or go. The other partner 
has no veto power, not even a power to delay. 
 
Id. 
29 Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates?: Evidence from 
Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608, 608 (1998). 
30 Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 325, 326 (1998). It should be noted, as Brinig and Buckley point out, that 
some of these results depend on the definition of “no-fault divorce” that is used, with some 
researchers defining it to mean that fault is irrelevant to the grant of divorce, and other 
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Other scholars, like Ira Mark Ellman and Sharon Lohr, argue that the rise in 
the divorce rate began before the advent of no-fault divorce laws, although data 
suggests that states may have experienced a short-term increase in the divorce rate 
immediately after the adoption of no-fault.31 Ellman points out that “nationally, 
divorce rates have been stable or declining since 1981 [which] is very difficult to 
reconcile with any claim that no-fault caused any important increase in divorce 
rates.”32 Many scholars believe that the rise in divorce rates throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s was mainly due to significant social and cultural changes such as 
increasing mobility of American families and increasing rates of employment of 
wives.33 
Sometime after the divorce rate rose, courts began to experience another 
phenomenon: a steady increase in the number of pro se divorce litigants. In a 1994 
publication, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Delivery of 
Legal Services cited several studies documenting a steady and significant increase 
in pro se divorce cases from the mid-1970s through the mid-1990s.34 Their report 
noted that both poor and moderate income persons had unmet family law needs, 
and that many people with moderate incomes were increasingly “turning to self-
representation as a method of gaining access to the divorce court.”35 A research 
project sponsored by the Standing Committee in 1991 in Maricopa County, 
Arizona, identified some of the elements that influenced the decision whether to 
proceed pro se. Pro se litigants tended to be fairly well-educated, and were on 
average younger and earned less than their lawyer-represented counterparts.36 
Litigants were more likely to self-represent if they regarded their cases as 
relatively “simple.”37 Thus, litigants with no minor children, litigants with no real 
estate or substantial personal property, and litigants married less than ten years 
were more likely to represent themselves.38 In addition, the report found that 
parties who had previously represented themselves were more likely to proceed 
pro se if divorcing again.39 
The report noted some limitations of pro se divorces, including the 
observation that pro se litigants were less likely to get help with forms, marital 
counseling, dispute resolution services, or tax advice; and were less likely to 
                                                 
researchers defining it to mean that fault is irrelevant not only at dissolution, but also for 
financial settlement. Id. at 326-28. 
31 Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW 
AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 342, 352 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2000). 
32 Id. 
33 See, e.g., id. at 351-61. 
34 ABA 1994 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-8. 
35 Id. at 1. 
36 Id. at 8-10. 
37 Id. at 12. 
38 Id. at 9-10. 
39 Id. at 10. 
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request maintenance.40 However, the report also noted a bright side to pro se 
divorces: there was a high satisfaction level on the part of pro se litigants, both 
with the terms of the eventual divorce decrees and with the legal process.41 
Although one might deduce from the list of limitations of pro se divorces that 
litigants were disadvantaged by representing themselves, the report did not draw 
that conclusion. The report did not evaluate the desirability of pro se divorces, but 
rather accepted them as a given, and advocated for reducing the complexity of the 
divorce process and offering more resources and assistance to self-represented 
divorce litigants.42 
In the ten-plus years that have elapsed since the 1994 ABA report, there has 
been little hard data about the continuing impact of pro se status on divorce 
litigants, and a paucity of data about whether self-represented divorce litigants are 
disadvantaged by proceeding without lawyers. 
There has, however, been some discussion in both popular and legal literature 
about whether pro se clients in non-divorce contexts are disadvantaged by 
representing themselves. Well-known criminal defendants such as Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian, Colin Ferguson and Zacharias Moussaoui famously represented 
themselves “with seemingly disastrous (and highly publicized) consequences.”43 
“The media frenzies surrounding these cases, combined with the ludicrous 
courtroom behavior of at least some of these defendants, has led to a perception 
that defendants who represent themselves are foolish at best and mentally ill at 
worst.”44 
In the context of criminal defendants, the United States Supreme Court 
recently held in Indiana v. Edwards45 that states can constitutionally insist upon 
representation by counsel, even for defendants competent enough to stand trial 
under the incompetency standard identified in Dusky v. United States.46 In Indiana, 
the Court found that despite competence to stand trial, a defendant may “be unable 
to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of 
                                                 
40 Id. at 11-12. 
41 Id. at 10-11. Notably, the report indicated similar levels of satisfaction on the part 
of litigants who had been represented by lawyers. 
42 See generally id. at 12-44 (recommending specific procedural and informational 
services which could be offered to help self-represented divorce litigants succeed in court). 
43 Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look 
at the Pro se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 423, 425 (2007). 
44 Id. at 426. 
45 Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008). 
46 “Dusky defines the competency standard as including both (1) ‘whether’ the 
defendant has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ 
and (2) whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding.’” Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 
U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). 
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counsel.”47 The Court noted the usefulness of lawyers in protecting the mentally ill 
defendant from humiliation resulting from self-representation at trial.48 
Although the unfair disadvantage suffered by a mentally ill, self-represented 
defendant may seem obvious,49 until recently there was a paucity of empirical data 
either supporting or debunking the idea that litigants who represent themselves are 
at a significant disadvantage.50 Measuring the relative advantages or disadvantages 
of self-representation would be most straightforward in cases where success is 
easily defined and only one party has the option of proceeding pro se, such as 
criminal prosecutions, but even here there has been a paucity of research.51 
However, recent empirical research has begun to address the question of whether 
pro se representation disadvantages the litigants who choose it. 
In Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro 
Se Felony Defendant,52 Erica J. Hashimoto challenged the “[c]onventional 
wisdom” that criminal defendants who represent themselves are self-destructive 
and unsuccessful. After examining three databases,53 Hashimoto concluded that 
pro se defendants do not necessarily have worse outcomes than defendants who are 
represented by counsel.54 Moreover, contrary to the widely held theory that 
criminal defendants who represent themselves are either mentally ill or proceeding 
from illegitimate motives, Hashimoto’s research suggests that pro se criminal 
                                                 
47 Id. at 2386. 
48 Id. at 2387. 
49 See id. The Indiana Supreme Court noted: “An amicus brief reports one 
psychiatrist’s reaction to having observed a patient (a patient who had satisfied Dusky) try 
to conduct his own defense: ‘[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane man 
to defend himself?’ Brief for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).” Id. 
50 See Hashimoto, supra note 43, at 425 (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 
152, 164 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)). In the criminal context, the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted the paucity of evidence on this point in 2000, stating that there was at that time “no 
empirical research . . . that might help determine whether, in general, the right to represent 
oneself furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution’s basic guarantee of fairness.” Id. 
51 As of 2001, the only study of pro se criminal defendants was written by two 
psychologists. See Douglas Mossman & Neal W. Dunseith, Jr., “A Fool for a Client”: 
Print Portrayals of 49 Pro se Criminal Defendants, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 408 
(2001), available at http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/abstract/29/4/408. Hashimoto’s 
article was the first empirical study of pro se criminal defendants to be published in the 
legal literature. Hashimoto, supra note 43, at n.62. 
52 Hashimoto, supra note 43, at 425. 
53 Id. at 438-41 (Federal Court Database, State Court Database, and Federal 
Docketing Database). 
54 Hashimoto counted complete acquittals and dismissals to compute the comparative 
overall success rates of represented defendants with those of pro se defendants. While 
“recognizing the limitations of the databases,” she concluded that the overall success rate 
was similar between the two groups across all three databases, and in some instances, better 
for pro se defendants. Id. at 450, 447-54. 
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defendants choose to self-represent “because of dissatisfaction with [court-
appointed] counsel.”55 
In criminal cases, the State necessarily proceeds with a lawyer. Only the 
defendant has the option of obtaining representation or not. Tax cases are similarly 
straightforward in the sense that one party, the IRS, is always represented by 
counsel, and only the taxpayer has the option of self-representation. In addition, 
taxpayers would likely agree that total success would release them from the 
obligation to pay any disputed taxes or penalties, while partial success would be a 
reduction in the required payments. 
In Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ 
Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes,56 Professor Leandra Lederman and 
Senior Financial Economic Analyst Warren B. Hrung examined a random sample 
of Tax Court cases to discern whether representation by counsel affected either the 
financial outcome of the case or the length of time to either trial or settlement. 
Their study found that attorney representation “significantly” improved the 
financial outcome in cases that went to trial.57 The presence of an attorney was not 
associated with better outcomes in settled cases, however.58 “The results also 
suggest that taxpayers’ attorneys do not affect the amount of time Tax Court cases 
take to settle or go to trial.”59 “The study thus found no support for the idea that 
attorneys delay case resolutions where they are paid by the hour. Attorneys did not 
close cases any faster than unrepresented litigants did, either.”60 The authors 
suggest that a lawyer’s expertise may lead to better results in a trial (as opposed to 
a settlement) because a lawyer’s contributions are most valuable “where the party 
to be persuaded is a judge rather than a government attorney—and where 
procedural expertise carries its greatest importance.”61 
The research on criminal defendants and tax litigants suggests that self-
represented litigants have, on average, a level of common sense and self-interest 
that seems to lead them to make rational decisions about when they can represent 
themselves without disadvantage, and when they need lawyers. The 1994 ABA 
report on the needs of self-represented divorce litigants suggested on the one hand 
that the high satisfaction levels of pro se litigants might indicate that they were as 
well off as their lawyer-represented counterparts. On the other hand, the identified 
limitations of pro se divorces, such as less help with forms and lower likelihood of 
requesting maintenance, might indicate that pro se divorce litigants were at a 
distinct disadvantage compared to attorney-represented divorce litigants. We 
wondered: in light of developments in law and procedure since the early 1990s, are 
                                                 
55 Id. at 454-85. 
56 Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys do their Clients Justice? An 
Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1235 (2006). 
57 Id. at 1239. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1282. 
61 Id. at 1281. 
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today’s divorce litigants better off if they are represented by lawyers, or are pro se 
divorce litigants equally successful? 
Measuring the effect of lawyers in the divorce context presents some unique 
problems. Since no entity of the State is a party in divorce proceedings, either party 
can choose between a lawyer and self-representation. So we are not only 
measuring the impact of a lawyer against a pro se litigant, we must also consider 
the situation where two self-represented clients proceed against each other. In a 
world without complete gender equity, it might matter whether it is the husband or 
the wife who proceeds pro se if only one party has counsel. 
We set out to compare the relative success of pro se and lawyer-represented 
divorce litigants in as objective a manner as possible. Success in the criminal or tax 
contexts is fairly easy to define: reduction or avoidance of penalties or taxes. 
“Success” is a far more slippery concept in the context of divorce. While merely 
obtaining a divorce decree was a form of success back in the days of fault-based 
systems where divorces were sometimes denied, this is no longer the case. 
Adoption of the no-fault divorce model led to virtually automatic grants of divorce 
to any couple requesting one;62 although, ironically, the no-fault concept was 
originally billed as having the exact opposite effect.63 
If we cannot define success in divorce litigation as obtaining the decree, then 
we must look at the terms of the decree to measure success. This too is 
problematic, and infinitely idiosyncratic. We could, for example, define success as 
obtaining a larger share of marital assets than the other spouse obtains. But some 
clients will not be satisfied with more than the other spouse; they want much more 
or all of the property. Other clients will want to get less than their spouse, possibly 
because of guilt over failure of the marriage. Moreover, the actual dollar amount 
may not be the real issue—certain items have symbolic or sentimental value, and 
despite a low market value, such property may be the subject of a ferocious dispute 
between the divorcing spouses.64 Even if we steadfastly maintain that “more” is 
                                                 
62 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical 
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984) [hereinafter Friedman, Rights of Passage]. 
One disgruntled spouse can certainly obtain a divorce by asserting that the marriage is 
broken, even over the other spouse’s objections. Id. 
63 The Report of the Governor’s Commission on the Family (issued in 1966 as part of 
the discussion leading to California’s adoption of a no-fault divorce statute) opined that the 
no-fault system would “require [. . .] the Court to inquire into the whole picture of the 
marriage.” Id. at 667 (citing CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, 
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 28-29 (1966)). The implication 
was a court might decline to grant a divorce if the court looked at the whole picture and 
decided that there was still hope for the marriage, but in fact the opposite occurred. See 
generally id. 
64 Disputes over the custody of pets illustrate this phenomenon. The family dog may 
have little market value, and American law traditionally treats pets as property. However, 
divorcing spouses may dispute Fido’s custody as vigorously as if he were a child. See Jane 
Porter, Custody Battles Over Pets Look Like a Dogfight, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2006, at Q-3; 
see also Ann Hartwell Britton, Bones of Contention: Custody of Family Pets, 20 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1 (2006).  
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always a better result, we are faced with the reality that some divorcing spouses 
illegally hide assets, so an examination of the property distribution in a divorce 
may not show the real picture. Finally, obtaining data about financial settlements is 
extremely difficult as it is likely not part of the public record. 
Measuring success in custody is even more difficult. For one thing, many 
parents would define custody success as having more contact time with the 
children, but some parents would surely define success as having less time with the 
kids. For another thing, the standard for custody decisions is, at least in theory, not 
based on the parents’ interests at all, but rather on the best interests of the child. So 
a divorce lawyer’s zealous advocacy for a client’s desired outcome might not be 
expected to yield the same sort of result that might occur where the standard does 
not depend on the unique characteristics of another person (the child) who is not a 
party to the litigation. Finally, emphasis on custody mediation and settlement 
between the parties could be expected to yield a multitude of idiosyncratic custody 
outcomes which cannot be compared in terms of success or failure. Indeed, a 
preliminary examination of randomly selected divorce files from our sample 
revealed a range of custody solutions so diverse that they could not be categorized. 
It appears that every divorcing family addresses custody in its own way. 
Even more problematic from our perspective was the fact that evaluation of 
success in terms of the property division or custody arrangement would best be 
accomplished by a survey or interview of the satisfaction levels of the now 
divorced individuals, but surveys and interviews discern subjective satisfaction 
levels. We hoped to find a more objective method of comparison. One such 
potential measure of success in the divorce context: is the award of spousal 
maintenance, or family support, in appropriate circumstances. 
Generally, spousal maintenance is awarded in the court’s discretion in divorce 
cases where one spouse has significant need and the other spouse has the ability to 
pay. It may sometimes be awarded in lieu of a property distribution. Payment of 
maintenance has never been the norm, and it is certainly awarded in only a 
minority of cases. However, Wisconsin is a state that has clear judicial doctrines 
about the cases in which maintenance awards are appropriate. 
Which clients are legally eligible to receive maintenance under Wisconsin 
law? The Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that a court should consider the 
potential recipient’s need for support, as well as the fairness of requiring the 
potential payer to provide some of that support.65 In general, maintenance could be 
reasonably awarded in situations where there is a relatively long marriage,66 a 
disparity in spousal incomes, and where one spouse is not capable of self-support 
                                                 
65 In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W. 2d 736, 741 (Wis. 1987). 
66 We can find no authoritative definition of a “long” marriage in the cases or statutes, 
as judges routinely exercise their discretion to find that marriages of different lengths are 
long enough to justify an award of alimony. The average length of a first marriage ending 
in divorce is eight years. See http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html. Thus, any marriage 
lasting over eight years is arguably relatively long. Later in the paper, we use fifteen years, 
or nearly twice the eight-year average, as a somewhat arbitrary round figure to denote a 
long marriage. 
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at the standard of living enjoyed during the later years of the marriage.67 Normally, 
any maintenance would be awarded for the length of time required for the lower-
earning spouse to become self-supporting at an acceptable standard; permanent 
maintenance could be awarded in cases where that is not likely to ever happen.68 
Like the complex no-fault rules of yore, the maintenance doctrines are more 
likely to be known and understood by lawyers. If lawyers have a positive impact 
on divorce outcomes, one would expect that divorce litigants who fit the profile of 
“appropriate maintenance recipients” would be more likely to obtain maintenance 
if their cases are handled by lawyers. If pro se status is indeed a disadvantage and 
represented status is an advantage, we would expect that appropriate maintenance 
recipients would be most likely to receive maintenance if they are represented by 
counsel but their spouses are not, and least likely to receive maintenance if they are 
self-represented and their spouses have counsel. We would also expect few 
maintenance awards where neither party is represented by counsel. Where both 
parties are represented by counsel, we might expect a somewhat larger number of 
maintenance awards, because lawyers may tend to encourage their clients to settle 
for something within the range of what a court is likely to order. However, it may 
be impossible to measure attorney effect on the maintenance issue where both 
parties are represented by counsel because we have no adequate means by which to 
assess the relative quality of the different lawyers. 
Another measure of attorney effect can be found in the length of time the 
divorce case takes from the filing of the petition to the granting of the divorce 
judgment. Divorce is a painful process for most couples, and it seems reasonable to 
assume that most clients would prefer to get through it as quickly as possible. 
Where lawyers are involved, a longer process could also be a more expensive 
process, at least if delays are due to additional attorney time spent on the case. We 
are cognizant of the fact that a longer time from filing of the petition to final 
judgment may also reflect factors such as the complexity of the case, the 
thoroughness of the lawyers, and the indecisiveness of the parties. Nonetheless, we 
believe that the impact lawyers have on the length of the divorce process is 
something of interest. 
Ultimately, all objective measures of lawyer effectiveness may be inadequate 
because it is possible that the benefits of having a lawyer are largely intangible. If 
this is the case, it would be worth knowing because it should have an impact on 
how we train lawyers to work with divorcing clients. 
 
                                                 
67 See generally In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W. 2d at 736 (The Court found 
that the circuit court had abused its discretion in awarding the wife in a twenty-five-year-
long marriage maintenance of $1,500 per month for five months and $1,000 per month for 
thirteen months. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, instructing it to consider 
whether the ex-wife could reasonably be expected, within eighteen months of divorce, to 
earn enough to support herself at the marital standard of living, which the court defined as 
the standard of living enjoyed in the latter years of the marriage. Id. at 741-44.). 
68 Id. at 741. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
A.  Description of Information Gathered 
 
Our research endeavors to answer two very general questions: (1) Why do pro 
se divorce litigants choose to represent themselves? and (2) Are lawyer-
represented divorce litigants better off than self-represented divorce litigants? 
Since there is no data that would directly answer these queries, we have asked 
seven specific questions whose answers will provide us with important clues about 
our general questions. In order to discern the reasons for self-representation in a 
divorce, we asked the following questions: (1) What percentage of divorce litigants 
opts to proceed pro se? and (2) What are the characteristics of individuals who 
elect to represent themselves in a divorce? Examination of how pro se status 
correlates with gender, age, length of marriage, income, and presence or absence of 
children of the marriage may give us some clues as to why some spouses elect to 
represent themselves in the divorce process, and whether the decision to self-
represent is sensible under the circumstances. 
In order to examine the possible effects of having attorney representation, we 
asked another set of questions: (1) What is the average length of time between the 
filing of a divorce petition and the final judgment of divorce? (2) Does lawyer 
representation affect the length of the divorce process? (3) In what percentage of 
divorce cases is maintenance awarded? (4) What are the characteristics of the 
divorce litigants in cases where maintenance is awarded? and (5) Does lawyer 
representation affect whether maintenance is granted or not? Comparing the length 
of time a divorce takes with attorney representation and without representation can 
provide clues about one possible effect of having legal counsel. Examination of the 
characteristics of divorce litigants in cases where maintenance is granted will help 
us to assess what percentage of persons who, under Wisconsin law, are reasonable 
recipients of maintenance are in fact receiving it. Then we will better address the 
question of lawyer effect: if lawyer representation does not correlate with 
maintenance awards generally, it could be because none of the divorcing parties 
are likely candidates for maintenance, and may not be a reflection of the lawyer’s 
impact on the outcome. On the other hand, if likely candidates for maintenance are 
no more likely to receive it despite being represented by counsel, there is a 
legitimate question about what the lawyer’s impact on the case outcome is. 
Our case sample was taken from Waukesha County, Wisconsin; a county with 
a total population of 360,767 as of the 2000 census,69 and a 2008 estimated 
population of 380,629.70 Waukesha County is adjacent to Milwaukee County, and 
includes residences that could be considered suburban, urban and rural. The 
                                                 
69 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Waukesha 
County, Wisconsin, http://factfinder.census.gov (enter “Waukesha County” in “Fast Access 
to Information” search field; then follow “2000” tab) (last visited June 15, 2007). 
70 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/55133.html (last visited June 26, 2007). 
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median family income in 1999 was $71,77371 and the 2007 median household 
income was $72,432.72 
We selected Waukesha County because although its residents represent a 
range of living situations and incomes, the median household income is 
considerably above both the median income for the state of Wisconsin and for the 
United States as a whole. If there is a significant pro se movement in the divorces 
of such an affluent county, we believe that it would suggest something other than 
sticker shock is involved in the rejection of lawyer representation by divorce 
litigants. In addition, since maintenance is rarely if ever awarded in cases where 
the parties have extremely low income, we wanted to examine a population where 
the median income makes maintenance a possibility for a noticeable percentage of 
divorce litigants. 
 
B.  Summary of Data Collected 
 
As described above, we first asked questions designed to give us 
straightforward descriptions of what was happening in the Waukesha County 
Family Court in 2005 in terms of the incidence of pro se litigants in different 
identified groups. We specifically addressed the following questions: (1) what 
percentage of divorce litigants opts to proceed pro se? and (2) What are the 
characteristics of individuals who elect to represent themselves in a divorce?  
Our research showed that 43.9% of the husbands and 37.7% of the wives 
chose to proceed pro se.73 Thus, the majority of husbands (56.1%) and wives 
(62.3%) had legal counsel.74 Moreover, we concluded that the relationship between 
the husband’s use of counsel and the wife’s use of counsel was statistically 
significant.75 In 46.4% of the divorce cases both the husband and wife had counsel 
and in 27.7% of the cases both individuals were pro se. It was relatively unusual 
for one spouse to have counsel and the other spouse to proceed pro se. In 9.7% of 
the cases the husband had counsel and the wife did not. In 15.9% of the cases the 
wife had counsel and the husband did not. 
Our research also gave us important information about the characteristics of 
divorce litigants who represented themselves as compared to those who chose to 
hire lawyers. We first examined the characteristics of the wives who chose to have 
representation compared to those who proceeded pro se. To do this, we compared 
the two groups of women for: their husband’s reported gross monthly income, their 
own gross monthly income, the length of their marriage (computed from date of 
                                                 
71 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographics Profile Highlights, supra note 69. 
72 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, supra note 70. 
73 See infra tbl.1, app. A (showing 43.9% (n=249) of the husbands and 37.7% (n=214) 
of the wives chose to represent themselves). 
74 Id. 
75 In other words, it was an association unlikely to occur by chance. A chi square test 
of independence examining the relationship between husband and wife having counsel was 
significant (χ2 (1, N = 567) = 128.83, p < .0001), indicating that there was a statistically 
significant association between the spouses’ decisions to obtain counsel or not. 
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marriage to date of divorce filing), and their age at divorce using independent t-
tests.76 Our data showed that women with legal counsel, compared to those without 
counsel, had husbands who earned significantly more money.77 However, there 
was no statistically significant difference in their own monthly income between the 
women with counsel and those without counsel.78 The data also revealed that 
women with counsel were married longer than were women without counsel,79 and 
that women with counsel were older at the time they filed for divorce than were 
those without counsel.80 
Having minor children was also statistically associated with women having 
counsel.81 Of the 311 women who had minor children, 67.2% had counsel82 and 
32.8% were pro se.83 In contrast, of the 253 women who did not have children, 
56.5% had counsel84 and 43.5% were pro se.85 In other words, women with 
children were 1.58 times more likely to have a lawyer (rather than proceed pro se) 
than were women without children. Our data showed that while having children 
increased the likelihood of a woman having legal counsel, it did not seem to matter 
how many children a woman has.86 
We found similar results when we compared men who had legal counsel to 
men who proceeded pro se. Compared to those without counsel, men with counsel 
                                                 
76 An independent sample t-test is an inferential statistical test that compares the 
means of two groups (e.g., women with lawyers compared to women without lawyers). The 
test determines if the means are, or are not, statistically equivalent to each other. A 
“statistically significant test” indicates that the group means are different. An independent 
t-test is computed to compare the two groups for each outcome variables of interest (i.e., 
income, length of marriage, etc). See FREDERICK J. GRAVETTER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, 
STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 260 (6th ed., Wadsworth Publishing 2008). 
77 For women with counsel, M = $5,194.41, SD = $4,800.70. For women without 
counsel, M = $3,813.19, SD = $2,563.23, t(324) = 3.03, p < .01. It should be noted that the 
sample size for this analysis is smaller than for the other analyses because some litigants 
elected not to report their incomes in the publicly available portion of the divorce file. 
78 Women with counsel: M = $3,166.67, SD = $2,050.19, women without counsel: M 
= $2,948.79, SD = $2,680.82, t(316) = .82, p = .41. 
79 M = 161.76 months, SD =111.53 for women with counsel, and M = 111.09 months, 
SD = 88.44 for women without counsel, t(552) = 5.54, p < .001. 
80 For women with counsel, M = 40.94 years, SD = 9.15, and for women without 
counsel, M = 35.24 years, SD = 9.17), t(560) = 7.16, p < .001. 
81 A chi square test of independence examining the relationship between the wife 
having counsel and her having minor children was significant (χ2 (1, N = 564) = 6.78, p < 
.01). 
82 (n = 209). 
83 (n = 102). 
84 (n = 143). 
85 (n = 110). 
86 The number of minor children did not differ between women with counsel (M = 
1.86, SD = .81) and without counsel (M = 1.78, SD = .77), t(314) = .87, p = .39. So, having 
minor children, but not necessarily the number of children appears to be associated with 
increased likelihood of women having counsel representation during the divorce. 
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had a higher reported gross monthly income87 and were married longer.88 Men with 
counsel were also older at the time they filed for divorce than were those without 
counsel.89 The median income of the wives was similar between the group of men 
that hired counsel and the group that did not, indicating that the income of the 
wives did not seem to affect the decision whether to hire a lawyer.90 
Having minor children was associated with men having legal counsel, just as 
it was associated with women having counsel.91 Of the 311 men who had minor 
children, 61.7%92 had counsel and 38.3%93 were pro se. In contrast, of the 253 men 
who did not have children, 49.4%94 had counsel and 50.6%95 were pro se. In other 
words, men with children were 1.65 times more likely to have a lawyer (rather than 
proceed pro se) than were men without children. As with the wives, having minor 
children, but not necessarily the number of children appeared to be associated with 
increased likelihood of husbands having attorney representation during the 
divorce.96 
These results are generally consistent with the ABA Working Group data 
from the early 1990s.97 For both men and women, those who represented 
themselves tended to be younger, tended not to have minor children, and were 
exiting relatively shorter-term marriages.98 Our data showed something slightly 
different from the 1994 ABA report in terms of the effect of litigants’ income, 
however. While the Working Group stated that pro se litigants earned less on 
average than their lawyer-represented counterparts, our research indicated that it is 
the husbands’ income that correlates with representation status for both spouses, 
while the wives’ income is not so correlated.99 
Next, we turned our attention to an examination of factors that might indicate 
whether hiring a lawyer noticeably affects either the process or the outcome of a 
                                                 
87 For men with counsel, M = $5,359.59, SD = $5,049.20; for men without counsel, M 
= $3,709.93, SD =$2,063.96, t(324) = 3.68, p < .01. 
88 For men with counsel, (M = 157.53 months, SD =110.12), for men without counsel, 
(M = 124.24 months, SD = 98.41), t(552) = 3.68, p < .001. 
89 Age of men with counsel: M = 42.59 years, SD = 9.93; Age of men without 
counsel: M = 39.03 years, SD = 10.16, t(560) = 4.17, p < .001. 
90 There was no statistically significant difference between the men with counsel (M = 
$3,166.87, SD = $2,466.88) and without counsel (M = $2,976.72, SD = $2,147.60) for 
wives’ monthly income, t(316) = .73, p = .47. 
91 Another chi square test of independence examining the relationship between the 
husband having counsel and his having minor children was statistically significant (χ2 (1, N 
= 564) = 8.62, p < .01). 
92 (n = 192). 
93 (n = 119). 
94 (n = 125). 
95 (n = 128). 
96 However, the number of minor children did not differ between men with counsel 
(M = 1.83, SD = .81) and without counsel (M = 1.84, SD = .77), t(314) = -.14, p = .89. 
97 See supra Part II. 
98 See id. 
99 See supra Part III.B. 
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divorce. As described above, we first investigated whether lawyer representation 
affects the length of the divorce process. 
Of the 567 divorce petitions examined 476, or 84%, resulted in a final 
judgment of divorce. Of the cases that did not result in a divorce final judgment, 
eighty-four were dismissed, two resulted in legal separation, and three were 
annulled. The mean length of time between filing a divorce petition and final 
judgment100 was 6.64 months, with a standard deviation of 3.10 months. The 
median length of time to final judgment was 6.0 months. Thus, most cases reached 
a final judgment within three to nine months, with the average length of six 
months. 
One possible outcome of having legal counsel is that the divorce process 
might take longer than it would if a case were handled pro se. To examine this 
issue, we compared the differences in length of divorce time for four situations: 
when both husband and wife had counsel,101 when both were pro se,102 when only 
the husband had counsel,103 and when only the wife had counsel.104 Our analysis 
showed that the divorce process was significantly longer in cases where both the 
husband and wife had counsel, as compared to situations where only one spouse 
had counsel or neither had counsel.105 Interestingly, the mean divorce length when 
both husband and wife were pro se was statistically shorter than all other 
situations. However, there was no statistically significant difference in length of 
divorce between situations when only the husband had counsel or when only the 
wife had counsel. In sum, when both individuals have counsel the divorce length 
was statistically the longest process. However, when neither individual has counsel 
the divorce length was statistically the shortest process. On average, the divorce 
length when both have counsel was approximately 3.75 months longer than when 
both were pro se. 
Next, we examined the possible effect that lawyer representation might have 
on awards of spousal support. In Wisconsin, either maintenance or family support 
can be awarded in divorce case decisions. As explained previously, family support 
includes both maintenance and child support and, as such, provides a stream of 
                                                 
100 This mean length of time excludes the dismissed cases. 
101 (n = 238). 
102 (n = 135). 
103 (n = 42). 
104 (n = 65). 
105 An analysis of variance was statistically significant (F(3, 476) = 61.19, p <.001), 
and Tukey HSD post hoc tests (p < .05) indicated that when both husband and wife have 
counsel (M = 8.16 months) the divorce time was significantly longer than when only the 
wife has counsel (M = 5.69), only the husband has counsel (M = 6.71) or when neither have 
counsel (M = 4.41). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests whether the means for two or 
more groups are equivalent. A significant ANOVA indicates there is more variance 
between the group means than is expected due to chance, thus not all means are equivalent. 
Follow-up post hoc statistical tests are then used to make all possible comparisons to 
determine specifically which means are different from each other. See GRAVETTER & 
WALLNAU, supra note 76, at 336. 
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income that may be used by the recipient spouse personally, as well as for child-
related expenses. We began by examining support awards that could be used 
personally by the recipient spouse, and hence originally considered family support 
and maintenance together. Overall, in 11.3% of the cases106 one spouse was 
awarded either family support or maintenance. In 8.6% of the cases maintenance 
was awarded,107 in 12.5% of the cases maintenance was left open,108 in one case 
the decision of maintenance was still pending arbitration, and maintenance was not 
awarded in 78.1% of the cases.109 Family support was awarded in 2.6% of the 
cases,110 left open in 0.7% of the cases,111 and was not awarded in 96.1% of the 
cases.112 In no case did someone receive both maintenance and family support; 
however, in seven cases where family support was awarded, maintenance decisions 
were left open. 
 
C.  Characteristics of the Maintenance and Family Support Awards 
 
We found that the husband was the payor of maintenance and family support 
in all but two of the cases. 113 Fifty-eight percent114 of the award decisions were for 
a set number of months, with the mean length of the awards being 60.69 months,115 
and the median length of awards being fifty-one months. The mean monthly 
payment in these cases was $1,767.80. There was a great deal of variation in the 
duration of the support awards. 17%116 of the awards were for permanent 
maintenance or family support. Eight percent117 of the awards were tied to the 
fulfillment of certain conditions, and were payable until events such as until 
finishing a college degree, obtaining full-time employment, retiring or selling the 
family home. Another 15.6% of the awards had a payment that was variable over 
time,118 and one person had a fixed, one-time payment award.119 
                                                 
106 (n = 64). 
107 (n = 49). 
108 (n = 71). 
109 (n = 443). 
110 (n = 15). 
111 (n = 4). 
112 (n = 545). 
113 See infra tbl.2 (summarizing the characteristics of the maintenance and family 
support decisions). 
114 (n = 37). 
115 (SD = 38.91). 
116 (n = 11). 
117 (n = 5). 
118 (n = 10). 
119 It is highly unusual to characterize a one time payment as support rather than 
property division, and we can only speculate as to why this was done, although we suspect 
that the choice may have been made for tax reasons. 
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To investigate the characteristics of divorce litigants in cases where pure 
maintenance120 was awarded, we conducted a series of analysis of variance to 
compare three groups (those where maintenance had been awarded, those where 
maintenance was not awarded, and those where maintenance had been left open) 
for differences in husbands’ gross monthly income, wives’ gross monthly income, 
length of marriage, length of divorce, age of husband, and age of wife.121  
We found that maintenance awards were associated with husbands earning a 
higher gross income, but were not associated with variations in the wives’ 
incomes.122 We also found that length of marriage significantly differed across the 
three groups.123 The couples in cases where maintenance was not awarded were 
married significantly less time than were the couples in the cases where 
maintenance was awarded or the decision was left open.124 
Age of the litigants was also significantly different across the three groups. 
Husbands were significantly older in cases where maintenance was awarded than 
when it was not awarded, however the husbands’ age in cases where maintenance 
was left open did not differ from the other two groups.125 Likewise, the wives’ age 
differed across the three groups126 such that wives were significantly older in cases 
where maintenance was awarded than in cases where maintenance was not 
awarded, and the age of wives in cases left open did not differ from the other two 
groups. The data showed that the length of the divorce process127 was significantly 
shorter for cases where maintenance was not awarded than the length of time for 
both cases where maintenance was awarded and left open.128 
                                                 
120 As opposed to family support which could properly be used for the support of 
either the spouse or the children. 
121 Tukey HSD post hoc tests (p < .05 criteria) were used to determine specific group 
differences. Table 3 provides descriptive means. See infra tbl.3. 
The analyses with husbands and wives income have smaller sample sizes due to 
missing data for the reports of income, and thus these analyses should be interpreted with 
caution. For the analysis with husbands’ income, there were thirty-seven cases with 
reported income where maintenance was left open, and there were 255 cases with reported 
income where no maintenance was awarded. For the analysis with wives’ income, there 
were twenty-eight cases with reported income where maintenance was awarded, 250 cases 
with reported income where maintenance was not awarded, and thirty-nine cases with 
reported income where the maintenance decision was left open. 
122 See infra tbl.3. We found that husbands made significantly more money in cases 
where maintenance was granted (M = $6,961.30) than in cases where they were not granted 
(M = $4,313.91). 
123 (F(2, 468) = 26.71, p < .001) and Tukey HSD post hoc tests indicated that couples 
had been married significantly longer in cases where maintenance was awarded than when 
it was denied or left open. 
124 Id. 
125 (F(2, 476) = 10.21, p < .001). Tukey HSD post hoc (p < .05) used. 
126 (F(2, 476) = 12.71, p < .001). Tukey HSD post hoc (p < .05) used. 
127 Computed as the time between filing a petition and judgment dates. 
128 (F(2, 476) = 13.63, p < .001). 
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Finally, although the presence of minor children of the marriage did not make 
the award of maintenance more likely, it appears that cases were more likely to 
have maintenance decisions left open when minor children were involved.129 
To investigate the characteristics of divorce litigants in cases where family 
support was awarded we conducted a similar series of analysis to compare those 
cases where family support had been awarded to those where family support was 
not awarded. Only three cases had decisions on support left open and so those 
cases were not included in the following analyses due to the small sample size. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the descriptive means and test statistics.130 
The findings indicate that the husband’s average gross monthly income was 
noticeably higher in cases where family support was awarded than when it was not 
awarded.131 We found that the length of the marriage was significantly longer in 
cases where family support was awarded than when it was not awarded.132 
Furthermore, the length of time for the divorce was significantly longer when 
family support was awarded than in cases where family support was not 
awarded.133 There were no statistically significant differences between the groups 
for age of wife, age of husband, or wife’s gross monthly income. 
As expected (given the fact that family support is defined as a combination of 
spousal and child support), there was an association between having minor 
children and being awarded family support.134 Specifically, in all of the fifteen 
cases where family support was awarded, there were minor children in the 
marriage. In the cases with minor children, 6% were awarded family support,135 
and 94% of the cases136 were not awarded family support.137 
                                                 
129 A chi square test of independence also indicates that maintenance awards were 
associated with there being minor children in the marriage (χ2 (2, N = 480) = 8.60, p < .05). 
Of cases with minor children (n = 254), 10.2% (n = 26) were awarded maintenance, 19.3% 
(n = 49) had maintenance decisions left open, and 70.5% (n = 179) were not awarded 
maintenance. However, for couples without minor children (n = 226), 10.2% (n = 23) were 
awarded maintenance, 9.7% (n = 22) were left open, and 80% (n = 181) were not awarded 
maintenance. 
130 See infra tbl.4. 
131 The husband’s average gross monthly income was $9,994.68 in the fifteen cases 
where family support was awarded compared to an average gross monthly income of 
$4,451.15 cases where family support was not awarded. 
132 An average marriage length of 205.20 months in cases where family support was 
awarded compared to an average marriage length of 138.77 months in cases where family 
support was not awarded. 
133 The average length of the divorce process was 8.40 months in cases where family 
support was awarded compared to an average divorce process time of 6.58 months in cases 
where family support was not awarded. 
134 (χ2 (1, N = 477) = 13.94, p < .001). 
135 (n = 15). 
136 (n = 236). 
137 Family support was never awarded in cases where there were no minor children, 
which is consistent with the definition of family support as being a combination of spousal 
and child support. 
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Next, we examined how lawyer representation was associated with 
maintenance awards by computing a chi square test of independence between the 
four types of cases (both have counsel, only husband has counsel, only wife has 
counsel, and both spouses were pro se) and maintenance decisions (maintenance 
awarded, maintenance not awarded, decision left open). We found an association 
between lawyer status and maintenance award outcomes.138 Specifically, both 
husband and wife had counsel in 77.6% of those cases where maintenance was 
awarded.139 In 12.2% of the cases awarding maintenance only the wife had 
counsel,140 and in 10.2% of the cases awarding maintenance, neither had 
counsel.141 Maintenance was never awarded in the cases where only the husband 
had counsel. We found a similar pattern in the seventy-one cases where 
maintenance decisions were left open. In 69.0% of those cases both husband and 
wife had counsel,142 in 14.1% of the cases only the wife had counsel,143 in 12.7% 
of the cases neither had counsel,144 and in 4.2% of the cases where maintenance 
was left open, only the husband had counsel.145 
In contrast, both husband and wife had counsel in 41.9% of those cases where 
maintenance was not awarded.146 In 13.6% of the cases not awarding maintenance, 
only the wife had counsel, in 33.6% of those cases neither had counsel, and in 
10.8% of those cases only the husband had counsel.147 Based on these findings it 
appears that maintenance was most likely to be awarded in cases where both 
husband and wife had representation. 
Due to the small number of cases where family support was awarded, similar 
chi-square analyses could not be accurately computed. Of the fifteen cases where 
family support was awarded, both the husband and the wife had counsel in twelve 
cases. In two cases, neither spouse had counsel. In one case, only the wife had 
counsel.148 
                                                 
138 A chi square test of independence tests whether there is an association between 
two variables. See GRAVETTER & WALLNAU, supra note 76, at 483. This chi square test 
was statistically significant indicating an association between lawyer status and 
maintenance award decisions (χ2 (6, N = 480) = 40.66, p < .001). Table 5 presents the 
percent of cases within the maintenance decisions that fell into the four types of 
representation categories. See infra tbl.5. 
139 In other words, maintenance was awarded in thirty-eight out of the forty-nine cases 
where both the husband and the wife had counsel. 
140 (n = 6). 
141 (n = 5). 
142 (n = 49). 
143 (n = 10). 
144 (n = 9). 
145 (n = 3). 
146 In other words, both the husband and the wife had counsel in 151 of the 360 cases 
where maintenance was not awarded. 
147 See infra tbl.5. 
148 In other words, both the husband and the wife had counsel in 80% of the cases 
where family support was ordered, and neither had counsel in 13.3% of the cases. 
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A final question that remains unanswered is whether clients who are legally 
eligible to receive maintenance under Wisconsin law are helped or harmed by 
having counsel or proceeding pro se. As discussed above, Wisconsin law envisions 
maintenance in cases where, after a relatively long marriage one spouse needs 
additional income to continue at the marital standard of living, and the other 
spouse can afford to pay some income for that purpose.149 Since we cannot directly 
assess the marital standard of living, we have limited ourselves to the pre-divorce 
family income.150 Specifically, we were interested in the cases in our sample of 
couples who were divorcing after fifteen or more years of marriage151 and who had 
a disparity of income. Of the forty-nine cases where maintenance was awarded, 
55.1% of the couples152 had been married for fifteen years or more. We also found 
that the earning disparity between spouses was significantly larger in cases where 
maintenance was awarded (M = $4,035.81) than when maintenance was not 
awarded (M = $1,250.55).153 
Due to the small sample size of maintenance cases we could not compute a 
chi square test of association between counsel and maintenance decisions. 
However, in 77.8% of the cases where maintenance was awarded, both husband 
and wife had counsel.154 In 11.1% of the cases only the wife had counsel, and in 
11.1% of the cases, neither had counsel.155 There was no case in which 
maintenance was awarded when only the husband had counsel. 
                                                 
149 See In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W. 2d 736 (Wis. 1987). 
150 It should be noted that divorce litigants are not required to disclose their incomes 
in the part of the file that is a public record. Many report it in the public part of the file 
anyway, and our analysis on this point is based on the income numbers for couples who 
chose to publicly report. 
Obviously, family income is only a rough approximation of the standard of living 
enjoyed by the couple, since wealthy couples could live frugally and poor couples could 
live beyond their means. 
151 (n = 143 couples). 
152 (n = 27). 
153 To examine the relationship between earning disparity and maintenance awards for 
this sample of couples who had been married at least fifteen years, a disparity of income 
variable was computed as the difference between the husband and wife’s reported income 
(higher numbers indicate how much more the husband makes than the wife). An 
independent t-test was computed to compare the earning disparity between the cases where 
maintenance was awarded and cases where maintenance was not awarded, t(68) = 3.13, p < 
.001. Missing data is again an issue with these analyses. There are thirteen cases in the 
maintenance group and fifty-seven cases in the no maintenance group that reported income, 
so these analyses should be interpreted with caution. 
154 (n = 22). 
155 For cases where only the wife had counsel, n = 3, and in cases where neither had 
counsel, n = 3. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS OF FINDING 
 
Our data provides us with important clues about the reasons for self-
representation in divorce, as well as clues about the effects of having lawyer 
representation. Although our research data cannot answer all questions, it does 
suggest that lawyers and law schools may need to approach education about 
divorce practice in new ways in order to best serve divorce litigants. 
 
A.  Why do Divorce Litigants Represent Themselves? 
 
Our data supported the popular notion that the decision about whether or not 
to hire divorce counsel is often based on financial considerations, since both 
husbands and wives were more likely to have counsel as the husbands’ income 
increased.156 Increases in the wives’ income did not seem to impact the decision of 
whether or not to hire a lawyer, however, there are probably factors involved in the 
decision other than whether there was enough money to pay an attorney fee and 
whether or not there was any property to divide.157 We can only speculate, but one 
possibility is that both husbands and wives feel a strong sense of entitlement to the 
husband’s income, perhaps because of social traditions of the husband being the 
primary breadwinner. Husbands may feel a stronger need to protect their 
ownership of their own incomes, but may not feel as entitled to pursue their wives’ 
earnings. Wives may feel a greater need to have income from the husband in order 
to maintain the marital standard of living, and they may feel entitled to some sort 
of stipend based on whatever child-rearing or homemaking services they have 
provided during the marriage. Whatever the reason, the litigants appeared more 
motivated to hire counsel as the husbands’ gross income increased. 
There were also non-monetary factors associated with the decision to hire 
counsel. Both men and women who hired counsel were older and had been married 
longer at the time the divorce was filed than were men and women who proceeded 
pro se. Again, we can only speculate, but a couple of possibilities are apparent. 
Age and length of marriage both suggest higher levels of education, either formal 
or through life experience.158 Greater experience might make a person more 
receptive to the sort of expert advice provided by a lawyer, and it might make a 
person more aware of the sorts of complications that might make such advice 
                                                 
156 See supra Part III.B. 
157 Since property valuations are in the part of the file that is not public record, we 
have no data on whether or not there was significant property to divide in any of these 
cases. We mean to suggest only that accumulation of property can result from either the 
husband or the wife’s income, and the fact that the husband’s income is associated with 
lawyer representation status, but the wife’s income is not suggests that other factors are at 
play. 
158 We were not able to gather data on the levels of formal education attained by the 
litigants. 
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desirable.159 People who have been married longer may feel that they have more 
invested in the relationship, and hence might seek help in order to leave the 
relationship as advantageously as possible. People who are older or have been 
married longer might also feel that they have more to lose, such as accumulated 
property, and may be more willing to invest in a lawyer in order to protect 
whatever property they share with their spouses. 
We also found that both men and women were more likely to have legal 
counsel when there were minor children in the marriage.160 This pattern may 
reflect a consciousness that there are important interests at stake, such as time with 
the children or preservation of decision-making authority with respect to the 
children. Hiring counsel may reflect a desire to protect those interests, and a 
willingness to make a financial sacrifice in order to achieve that protection. Parents 
of minor children may also hire lawyers in the hopes of having a smoother process 
with better results that will protect their children from losing important 
relationships or economic benefits that have been enjoyed during the marriage. 
It should be noted that factors such as higher husband income, longer 
marriage and minor children are all factors that complicate resolution of legal 
issues in a divorce, and may make self-representation inadvisable. On the other 
hand, litigants with lower incomes, shorter marriages and no minor children may 
indeed be able to adequately handle their cases pro se. It appears, therefore, that 
many litigants have realistic ideas about when they need lawyers and when they do 
not, and that these litigants act accordingly. 
 
B.  Do Lawyers Make a Difference? 
 
Our data showed that the divorce process was longest when both parties were 
represented by legal counsel and shortest when both parties were pro se.161 Since 
longer cases generally cost more, it is possible that lawyers deliberately extend the 
process so as to collect higher fees. However, as described above, the divorce 
litigants who are most likely to hire counsel are the litigants with complicating 
factors such as higher husband income, longer marriage and minor children. Since 
the issues raised by these factors typically take time to resolve, it is likely that 
lawyers are not causing the delays, even though the methods of resolution 
employed by lawyers do take more time. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of lawyers in relation to maintenance 
awards. We found that maintenance was most likely to be awarded when both the 
husband and the wife had legal counsel, although approximately 10% of the 
maintenance awards were in cases where neither party had counsel.162 One 
                                                 
159 However, as noted earlier in this article, data compiled by the ABA Working 
Group indicated that pro se litigants were “reasonably well-educated, with most having 
some college.” ABA 1994 REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
160 See supra Part III.B. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
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possibility is that the presence of lawyers makes a maintenance award more likely, 
because lawyers understand when a judge might award maintenance under 
Wisconsin law, and encourage their clients to settle for something that would be 
reasonable under the law. It is also possible that litigants have a basic instinct 
about when maintenance is a reasonable likelihood, and that those litigants are 
more likely to hire lawyers to negotiate more favorable terms for the maintenance. 
Under this theory, the lawyers would not make it more likely that clients would get 
or pay maintenance, rather, the lawyers would have input into the terms of the 
maintenance agreement. 
We are cognizant of the fact that we did not measure all possible lawyer 
effects on the divorce process. It is possible, for example, that persons who are 
represented by counsel have different satisfaction levels with the divorce process 
than do people who represent themselves. We considered, but decided against, the 
collection of data about one objective method for assessing post-divorce 
satisfaction; namely, the number of post-judgment actions initiated by the divorced 
parties. Presumably, people who are satisfied with their divorce outcomes would 
carry on their post-divorce lives without revisiting and re-litigating past 
grievances, while dissatisfied people would attempt to re-litigate in the hopes of 
obtaining a more favorable outcome the second time around. The structure of 
current Wisconsin divorce law, however, largely prevents extensive post-judgment 
actions, except in limited circumstances involving child custody. Specifically, 
property distributions and waivers and denials of maintenance are final.163 Custody 
orders cannot be reopened until at least two years have passed since the initial 
custody order, except in cases where the child is at serious risk of significant 
harm.164 While the family court decisions are appealable (like those of any trial 
court), in fact only a small percentage of litigants appeal portions of their divorce 
orders, and the number who do so without lawyers is likely to be so small that no 
useful data could be gleaned. 
Subjective satisfaction with divorce outcomes could also be measured by 
interviews or surveys. In this study, we tried to limit ourselves to objective rather 
than subjective data, such as the sort of oral or written surveys of divorced persons 
that might discern their satisfaction levels after their divorces. The data reported by 
the ABA Working Group in the early 1990s suggested that many pro se litigants 
have high levels of satisfaction.165 A fruitful area for future research might be the 
examination of satisfaction levels at this point in time, after developments in court 
processes, divorce law and society. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The widespread phenomenon of pro se divorce litigation is undoubtedly here 
to stay, and that may not be a bad thing for many litigants. It appears that many 
                                                 
163 WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1)(c)(b) (2006). 
164 WIS. STAT. § 767.45(1)(a) (2006). 
165 ABA 1994 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
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divorcing couples are accurate in their assessment of whether they need lawyers or 
not. Lawyers are increasingly being relegated to more complex cases involving 
long-term marriages, significant property, higher income, and minor children. To 
the extent that lawyers handle “simple” divorces, their role as buffers from the 
conflict may be more important than their legal expertise. Law school curriculums 
may need to adjust to the changing needs of divorce clients by providing more 
education on conflict resolution and client counseling on the one hand, and more 
detailed instruction on the kinds of property and custody disputes that are likely to 
result in lawyer involvement on the other hand. Thus, legal education should 
prepare lawyers to help their clients psychologically by reducing stress and conflict 
during the divorce process, as well as by providing the sophisticated analysis and 
handling of the complex legal issues for which a lawyer’s expertise is most often 
sought. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1. Percent and number of husbands and wives who have legal counsel or 
proceed pro se. 
 Wife had counsel 
n = 353 (62.3%) 
Wife pro se 
n = 214 (37.7%) 
Husband had counsel 
n = 318 (56.1%) 
n = 263 
46.4% 
n = 55 
9.7% 
Husband pro se 
 n = 249 (43.9%) 
n = 90 
15.9% 
n = 159 
27.7% 
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of awards.  
Type of 
payment* 
Frequency Percent** Length of 
payment in 
months 
Amount of monthly 
payment 
Permanent 11 17.2 Indefinitely Mean = $1,260.73 
SD = $1,035.85 
Median = $1,500 
Range $200 to $3,500 
Set # months 37 57.8 Mean = 60.69  
SD = 38.58  
Median = 51 
Range 7 to 156 
Mean = $1,767.80 
SD = $2,084.75 
Median = $1,000 
Range $140 - $7,500 
Conditional 
*** 
5 7.8  Mean = $2,614.80 
SD = $2,170.22 
Median = $2,674.00 
Range $250 to $6,000 
Variable 
payment****  
10 15.6 Mean = 136.90 
SD = 106.28 
Median = 89.50 
Range 34 to 339  
Weighted mean = 
$2,349.20 
SD = $1,519.81 
Median = $2,411.50 
Range = $509 to 
$5,718 
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Table Notes 
 
* One person received a one-time payout of $14,000. This payment was not 
included in any of the calculations for mean payments or length of award. 
** This percent is of the number of people who received either a maintenance 
or family support award (n = 64). 
*** Conditional awards were monthly payments until some specified event, 
such as bachelor’s degree completion, full-time employment, retirement, or sale of 
a home. Thus, length of payment was not computable. 
**** Variable payments changed, generally decreasing in value, overtime. To 
compute the mean monthly payment, the monthly payments were weighted by the 
number of months to allow for the computation of weighted values. Thus, this 
reflects the average monthly award, recognizing that some months had higher 
payments and some months have lower payments than this weighted mean. 
 
 
Table 3. 
 Maintenance 
awarded 
Maintenance left 
open 
Maintenance 
not awarded 
F-statistic 
Husband’s 
gross 
monthly 
income 
$6,961.30 $4,793.88 $4,313.91 F(2, 320) = 5.98, p < .01 
Wives’ gross 
monthly 
income 
$2,683.30 $2,540.97 $3,211.20 F(2, 314) = 1.86, p = .16 
Length of 
marriage (in 
months) 
225.43 172.97 121.99 F(2, 468) = 26.71, 
p <.001 
Age of wife 
(in years) 
43.63 41.16 37.41 F(2, 476) = 12.71, 
p < .001 
Age of 
husband (in 
years) 
46.06 42.74 39.71 F(2, 476) = 10.21, 
p < .001 
Length of 
divorce (in 
months) 
8.02 7.77 6.22 F(2, 476) = 13.63, 
p < .001 
 
Note. Degrees of freedom for gross monthly income vary from total sample size 
due to missing data in Table 3. 
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Table 4. 
 Family Support 
awarded 
Family 
Support not 
awarded 
F-statistic 
Husband’s gross 
monthly income 
$9,994.68 $4,451.15 F(1, 319) = 18.53, p < .01 
Wives’ gross 
monthly income 
$2,152.61 $3,099.39 F(1, 313) = .97, p = .33 
Length of 
marriage (in 
months) 
205.20 138.77 F(1, 466) = 5.64, p < .05 
Age of wife (in 
years) 
41.71 38.56 F(1, 474) = 1.48, p = .22 
Age of husband 
(in years) 
44.29 40.71 F(1, 474) = 1.65, p = .20 
Length of 
divorce (in 
months) 
8.40 6.58 F(1, 474) = 5.05, p < .05 
 
Note. Degrees of freedom for gross monthly income vary from total sample size 
due to missing data. Due to the small sample size of cases being awarded family 
support (and missing data for monthly income), these findings should be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
 
Table 5. Percentage of cases within each maintenance award decision that fell into 
each legal representation category. 
 Both have 
counsel 
(n = 238) 
Wife only has 
counsel (n = 
65) 
Husband only 
has counsel (n 
= 42) 
Neither have 
counsel (n = 
135) 
Maintenance 
awarded (n = 
49) 
77.6% 
n = 38 
12.2% 
n = 6 
0% 
n = 0 
10.2% 
n = 5 
Maintenance 
not award (n = 
360) 
41.9% 
n = 151 
13.6% 
n = 49 
10.8% 
n = 39 
33.6% 
n = 121 
Decision left 
open 
(n = 71) 
69.0% 
n = 49 
14.1% 
n = 10 
4.2% 
n = 3 
12.7% 
n = 9 
 
Note. Cases where family support was awarded are not included in this table. 
